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CONGRESSIONAL R ECO RD 
SENATE P R OCEEDINGS 
Septembe r 4, 1963 
15462 
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for 
several weeks, the Senate has had the 
proposed treaty on nuclear testing. 
The question has been examined in-
tensively not only by the Committee on 
Foreign Relations but also by members 
of the Aimed Services Committee and 
the Sena te members of the Committee 
on Atomic Energy, all of whom were in-
vited to participate in the hearings, and 
all of whom collectively comprise more 
than one-third of the membership of 
the Senate. • 
There has been in process, in short. a 
very thorough Senate consideration of 
the proposed treaty. The specific ques-
tions have already been asked and 
answered, as far as it has been possible 
to answer them. The specific doubts 
have been raised , and, as far as possible, 
laid to rest. 
We are now approaching a point at 
which we must put the penultimate 
question in solitary conscience. It is 
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this decision which will produce the 
final vote by which the Senate will 
either give or withhold consent to ratifi-
cation of the proposed treaty. 
The issue now is not whether Ger-
many mistrusts the treaty or France 
mistrusts it more or Communist China 
most of all. 
The issue, now, is not solely the mean-
ing of the treaty for health and human 
genetics, or for military strategy or for 
the technology and costs of scientific 
arms competition. 
All these issues and others have been 
considered in the painstaking interroga-
tion of the past few weeks. Each has 
its own unique significance. But each is 
a fragment of the penultimate question 
and must be so regarded if we are to 
reach sound decision. 
For the question which now confronts 
us is the one question which is the sum 
of the many questions. And a rational 
response to it can only be the sum of the 
many responses, weighed in the scale of 
such wisdom and judgment as each of us 
may possess. The attitude of no single 
expert or group of experts in or out of 
Government, no single official or group 
of officials of this Government, no single 
scientist or group of scientists can be 
controlling on this question. The ques-
tion is for us alone to decide. It is not 
for any scientist, military leader, cabinet 
secretary or whatever to decide for us. 
It remains now for elected Senators to 
decide for themselves, to confirm or re-
fuse to confirm the judgment of an 
elected President. 
This penultimate question which con-
fronts us is simply stated: Does the pro-
posed treaty serve, on balance, the 
interests of the people of the United 
States, when those interests are consid-
ered in their totality? Or to put it neg-
atively: Is the proposed treaty, on 
balance, inimical to the interests of the 
people of the United States? 
If it is inimical, obviously, the Presi-
dent should not have had the treaty 
signed in the first place and, certainly, 
the Senate should not now consent to its 
ratification. But if the treaty passes 
even a minimal test, if reason tells us 
that, on balance, the treaty is not in-
imical to this Nation, then that alone 
would seem to be su.fflclent grounds for 
approving it. For if we mean what we 
say when we speak of supporting the 
leadership of the President, irrespective 
of party, in his great national responsi-
bil!ties in foreign relations, we must 
mean, at least, that in matters of this 
kind, we are inclined to give him the 
benefit of those vague and residual 
hesitancies by which each of us ih his 
own way may be possessed. 
And may I add, Mr. President. that I 
do not see how any Senator can vote 
either for or against this treaty with a 
sense of absolute assurance. In any ma-
jor essay in foreign relations there are 
bound to be-and there should be-hesi-
tancies. They would be there if we de-
bated the proposed treaty or any major 
issue, a month, a year or a decade. 
There were doubts and hesitancies 
when a Republican Congress voted a 
Marshall plan under a Democratic Pres-
ident. There were doubts and hesitan-
cies when a Democratic Congress voted 
a Middle East resolution under a Republi-
can President. The doubts are there year 
in and year out when Congress considers 
the foreign aid program. For the simple 
truth is that there are no certainties, no 
absolutes in significant matters of for-
eign relations. 
Indeed, were there no doubts on this 
question of a nuclear test ban that in 
itself would be cause for the deepest con-
cern. For the absence of any doubt 
would suggest either a dangerous delu-
sion or an insipid insignificance in the 
treaty. 
The truth is that there are risks in 
this as in any venture in foreign rela-
tions. But I remind the Senate that 
there are also risks in failing to venture, 
in standing still in a world which does 
not stand still for this or any other na-
tion. And at this moment in the world's 
time, the risks of a paralyzed uncertain-
ty may be far greater than those which 
might stem from the pursuit of this ven-
ture. 
Indeed, there is a strong presumption 
that such must be the case. I say that, 
Mr. President, because this proposed 
treaty is no instant fancy, no sudden 
concoction. We have not arrived in haste 
at this point of decision. The active 
pursuit of a treaty to ban nuclear tests 
began many years ago under the ad-
ministration of President Eisenhower. 
The previous administration was not pas-
sive and negative in its approach. It 
sought a treaty in a most active and 
positive fashion. Indeed, the former 
Vice President, Mr. Nixon, journeyed to 
Moscow in 1959 in an effort to further 
this objective, among others, of U.S. for-
eign policy. And in a letter dated April 
13, 1959, President Eisenhower wrote Mr. 
Khrushchev that: 
The United States strongly seeks a lasting 
agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear 
weapons tests. 
Note, Mr. President, the phrase 
"strongly seeks." 
In short, Mr. President, the search for 
a nuclear test ban treaty was clearly a 
cardinal element in the foreign policy of 
the Nation during the second Eisenhower 
administration. When Mr. Kennedy as-
sumed office, he did hot have to continue 
that search. He could have abandoned 
it. He could have ignored the efforts of 
the previous administration. He could 
have turned his back on the affirmations 
in favor of a nuclear test ban treaty, as 
they were contained in the platforms of 
both parties during the 1960 presidential 
campaign and upon which Mr. Kennedy 
and Mr. Nixon stood for office. That is 
a prerogative of the Presidency, and Mr. 
Kennedy could have exercised it had he 
judged, after a full examination of all 
relevant information, that the policy was 
detrimental to the interests of the 
Nation. 
But Mr. Kennedy did not so find. On 
the contrary, he pursued the matter even 
as Mr. Eisenhower had done before him. 
And he continued to pursue it in spite of 
repeated setbacks and frustrations not 
unlike those undergone by his predeces-
sor, until an agreement was, at last ini-
tialed by his distinguished agent, the 
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Averell 
Harriman, on July 25, 1963. That agree-
ment, I would note in order to emphasize 
its nonpartisan nature, is more closely in 
accord with the concept of a nuclear test 
ban as it is contained in the Republican 
Party's presidential platform in 1960 
than it is with the similar plank in the 
Democratic Party's platform. 
It is conceivable that one President of 
the United States may have misjudt::cd 
the American interest in this highly sig-
nificant matter, although I do not for a 
moment suggest that such was the case 
with President Eisenhow~. But I find 
it most difficult to believe that two Presi-
dents in succession would be guilty of 
negligence or poor judgment on precisely 
the same question of national interest. 
No, Mr. President, there is a strong pre-
sumption that a test ban treaty is not 
only not inimical to the interests of the 
people of the Nation but also is to their 
positive advantage, 
Further, Mr. President, when members 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Armed Services 
and the Senate members of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy probe 
every word, comma, and period of the 
text of the treaty; when they examine 
every conceivable implication of the 
treaty for days on end; when they hear 
countless relevant witnesses of the exec-
utive branch, including the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Chiefs, the Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and the Director of 
the CIA give sober but unmistakable sup-
port for this treaty; when the commit-
tees summon for testimony not only the 
advocates of this treaty but also its most 
articulate and competent opponents-in 
short, when the treaty is subjected to the 
most stringent Senate committee scrutiny 
and the great preponderance of Informed 
testimony is favorable-there is a strong 
presumption that the treaty is in the pos-
itive interests of the United States. 
I should like to read an extract from 
the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff before the combined committees In 
executive session. This testimony I un-
derstand, after checking, has now been 
cleared. I refer to this extract because 
of the particular importance which is 
attached to the defense aspects of the 
treaty. 
Senator MANSFIELI>--
Asking a question of General LeMay-
General, did I understand you correctly-
you do favor the ratification o! this treaty? 
General LEMAY. Providing the safeguards 
are forthcoming. 
Senator MANSFIELD. General Wheeler-
Who, of course, is the Chief of Staff 
of the Army-
Did I understand you In the same sense? 
General WHEELER. Yes, sir. 
Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral McDonald? 
Who, of course, is the Chief of Naval 
Operations-
Admiral McDoNALD. Yes, slr. 
Senator MANSFIELD. General Shoup? 
Who, of course, Is Commandant of the 
Marine Corps-
General SHOUP. Definitely. 
Senator MANSFIELD. That Is all, Mr. Chair-
man. 
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And yet, Mr. President, a strong 
presumption is not enough in a matter 
of this kind. Each Senator has an in-
dividual responsibility to examine this 
treaty for himself In the light of his 
own conscience and his own concept of 
the interests of his State and the Nation. 
The Senator from Montana has done 
so, and he has just returned from report-
ing to the people whom he represents on 
his position on this treaty, which will 
be before the Senate very shortly. And 
having done so, he is persuaded that the 
proposed treaty does no violence to but, 
on the contrary, serves the interests of 
the people of his State and the Nation. 
It serves those interests, Immediately 
and tangibly, in matters of public health 
as they may involve a resident or a child 
yet to be born in Montana or in any one 
of the 50 States. I refer, Mr. President, 
to the question of radiation which, as an 
uninvited but ever-present spectator, has 
haunted these hearings of the past few 
weekB. To be sure, there may be a lack 
of certainty among scientists and doctors 
on the precise effects of manmade ra-
diation on health and the human species. 
But let there be no mistake about it. 
There is a minimal concept of the dan-
gers of radiation from which reputable 
scientific and medical opinion does not 
depart. I.t is expressed very clearly in 
the unanimnus report of the United Na-
tions Scientific Committee on the Facts 
of Atomic Radiation, 17th Session of the 
General Assembly, 1962. In this report, 
scientists from 15 nations, including 
France, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
and Canada recorded their unanimous 
agreement that--
The exposure o! mankind to radiation !rom 
Increasing numbers o! artificial sources ln-
cludlng the worldwide contamination o! the 
environment with short- and long-Uved 
radlonucl1des from weapons tests calls !or 
the closest attention particularly because the 
el'!ects o! any Increase In radiation exposure 
may not be tully manl!ested !or several dec-
ades In the case o! somatic disease and !or 
many generations In the case or genetic dam-
age. There should be no misunderstanding 
about the reality o! genetic damage !rom 
radiation. The Committee therefore em-
phasizes the need that all forms o! u n neces-
sary radiation exposure should be minimized 
or avoided entirely, particularly when the 
exposure ot large popula tlons Is en tailed. 
Mr. President, so far as I am aware, 
that statement has not been challenged 
from a reputable medical or scientific 
source anywhere in the world. It is a 
most conservative statement and one 
must question the sobriety of anyone 
who would pass off the factor of radia-
tion damage as irrelevant or propagan-
distic In the consideration of the pro-
posed treaty. It Is of central importance. 
For what the statement says, In effect, Is 
that we do not know precisely how harm-
ful manmade radioactivity Is but we are 
certain that tt is not good for human 
health or for the genetics of the human 
race. It is not good, in short, !or men, 
women and children-and particularly 
children-in Montana, Arizona, Ohio, 
Washington, Nevada, Mississippi, Utah, 
or Missouri any more than In London, 
Paris, Moscow, Pelplng or Tokyo. What 
the statement says, in effect, Is that 
radiological techniciall8 in hospitals do 
not wear heavy protective clothing and 
dentists do not shelter themselves for 
the fun of it when they take X-rays. 
They do so because the stuff of X-rays, 
as of nuclear bomb tests, Is lnsiduously 
dangerous. What the statement says, in 
effect, is that it is highly inadvisable to 
put even minute quantities of strontium 
90 or 89 into milk or to add other radio-
act ive isotopes such as iodine 131 or 
cesium 137 to bread, as though they 
were vitamin A, B, C, or D. They are 
quite the reverse in their effect on hu-
man h ealth and on the human species. 
The statement says, in short: handle 
manmade radioactivity with extreme 
care or, preferably, do not handle it at 
aU. 
Yet we have been compelling our own 
people to handle it, as well as the Rus-
sian people and others, and the Rus-
sians have been compelling their people 
as well as ours and others to handle it. 
That has been the consequence of bomb 
tests because, beyond the radiation re-
leased in proximity to a tes t site, the 
phenomenon of fallout results in a wide 
distribution throughout the world from 
each detonation, wherever it may occur. 
And radioactivity is both ideologically 
neutral and wholly indifferent to na-
tional boundaries. When carried in the 
air currents and clouds of the atmos-
phere It places free peoples, Communist 
peoples or whatever, all on this planet, 
in the same radioactive boat. 
We w!ll find some scientific voices say-
ing that it is not too bad and very tem-
porary, this thing which has already 
been done by nuclear bomb tests to the 
planetary setting In which all human 
life is lived. we will find some scientific 
opinion which takes the opposite view, 
that the genetic damage already done 
has been very substantial. And we will 
find many scientists who say so far it is 
not too bad, but we had better avoid 
much more. That there are these dif-
ferences Is a reflection not so much of a 
disagreement on the !acts but of a 
paucity of facts and of differing values 
which are put on the integrity of the in-
dividual human life. Some are more 
prepared than others, apparently, to 
sacrifice this Integrity on the altar of 
science !or what is regarded as a valid 
scientific or defense purpose. 
In terms of statistics, our own Federal 
Radiation Council has made some esti-
mates of the human costs of the radio-
active byproducts of nuclear bomb tests-. 
The figures which It supplies are ax-
elusive of tbe effects of the last Russian 
test series of superbombs in 1962. The 
Council Indicates that all tests in the 
United States and throughout the world 
through 1961 cnuld produce In this Na-
tion In this and future generations any-
where up to 15,000 cases of gross phys-
Ical and mental birth defects and, 
pt>ssibly, up to a maximum of 2,000 
leukemia cases and up to a maXimum of 
700 cases of bone cancer within the next 
70 years. Other adverse health etrects 
of these tests, as, for example, those of 
radioactive Iodine 131 to ch11dren's 
thyroids in the vicinity of tests sites in 
the Mountan States of the West, are 
strongly suspect. The same is true of 
ce5ium 137 which has been del!vered In 
heavy quantities to Eskimos in Alaska as 
a result of Soviet tests in the Arctic. 
Still other ill effects cannot even be 
guessed at, as, for example, those of 
carbon 14, which has a radioactive life 
of several thousand years and may be 
said, therefore, to have already altered 
the human environment permanently. 
Because of the difficulty in under-
standing some of these terms, I ask unan-
imous consent that at this point in my 
remarks definitions of some of the items 
which I referred to, as well as others not 
mentioned, be incorporated in the REc-
ORD. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
WALTERS in the chair). Is there objec-
tion? 
There being no objection, the defini-
tions were ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
Radlonucllde Is an isotope of an element 
wi th radioactive characteristics. 
Isotope Is an unstable variation or an 
element. 
Strontium 90 is a long-llvcd radlonucllde 
(halt-life 28 years) with chemical properties 
similar to calcium. (Strontium ltselt Is an 
alka l!ne earth-metal element at No. 38.) 
Strontium 90 tends to deposit In bones, en-
tering the body In the total diet but espe-
cia lly through milk, wheat products, and 
vegetables. 
Strontium 89 Is a radlonucllde, similar to 
strontium 90 but has a halt-ll!e o! only 50 
days. It, too, deposits preferentially In 
bones. Milk Is the significant dietary con-
tributor of strontium 89 but It also attaches 
to the surface ot other foods. 
Cesium 137 Is a long-lived radlonucllde 
(halt-lite 30 years). (Cesium ltselt Is a soft 
metallic element at No. 55.) Cesium 137 dis-
tributes throughout the soft-tissues of the 
body, with milk, meat and vegetables the 
main sources. AI; In the case ot strontium 
90, dietary measurements o! cesium 137 
fluctuate In consonance with the fallout rate. 
Iodlne 131 Is a short-lived radlonucllde 
(halt-lite 8 days). (Iodine ltselt Is a non-
metallic crystalline element at No. 53.) De-
posited In the body, Iodine 131 concentrates 
In the thyroid gland. Residence time, as 
well as half-lite, Is short. The moet signifi-
cant dietary contributor Is milk. 
Carbon 14 Is a very long-lived radlonucllde 
(halt-lite 5,760 years). It Is similar to non-
radioactive carbon and Is produced both -nat-
urally by cosmic radiation and artificially 
by bomb tests. The level ot carbon 14 In the 
environment tends to decrease only as It en-
teres carbonates o! the deep ocean waters 
and sediments. All Items o! diet contribute 
to• the amount of carbon 14 In the body In 
proportion to their carbon content. 
Tritium Is the radioactive Isotope of hy-
drogen (halt-ll!e 12.4 years) which Is pro-
duced both naturally and by fallout. It 
combines with oxygen to produce radioactive 
water 'fhlch goes everywhere ordinary water 
goes. On July 22, 1963 the Department of 
Interior announced that tritium had reached 
the highest concentration In ralnwate'r ever 
measured by the Geological Survey. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, It 
ls all very well to note that the statisti-
cal projections suggest only a very small 
number of Amerlcall8 as adversely af-
fected by all tests throughout the world 
through 1961. But it would not be very 
well to tell that to the specific Amerlcall8 
who w1ll suffer the coll8equences. Fur-
thermore, It is clear that the RUSsian 
test series of 1962 wlll add to the specl.ftc 
totals of health damage already pro-
jected in the United States. It is clear, 
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too, that any additional tests in the at-
mosphere by the Soviet Union, the 
United States, or any other country will 
do the same and, in the absence of a 
treaty, the addition to the totals can be 
large or small, depending upon the whim 
and the capacity not only of ourselves 
but of the Soviet Union or any other 
nation. 
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to 
yield. 
Mr. GORE. I have listened with great 
Interest to the able address of the dis-
tinguished majority leader. Like me, 
he does not claim the capacity to reach 
scientific judgment in this complicated 
and technical field. 
As the Senator knows, it has been my 
privilege to serve on the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, and I have lis-
tened to many scientists discourse upon 
this subject. One thing I have never 
heard any scientist say Is that any addi-
tional radioactivity would be beneficial 
to the human race. They may disagree 
as to the level of radiation that would 
be tolerable-the tolerance point, so to 
speak-they may disagree as to the 
averaging and as to the probabilities of 
IndividualS being severely damaged as a 
result of accidental dosage of more than 
the median amount of radiation; but I 
have never heard any scientist say that 
any additional radiation would be help-
ful to the human race. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I deeply appre-
ciate the remarks of the Senator from 
Tennessee. This is not the first time he 
has made comments of that nature; and, 
in all honesty, I must admit that one of 
the reasons I am making this speech to-
day is because of the comments he has 
made on this particular subject over the 
years. So I am deeply appreciative of 
the comments he has just made. 
Mr. President, it is clear, in short, that 
however small the effects appear to be 
in the statistical computation, nuclear 
bomb testing has already caused a dam-
age to human health and, potentially, 
its continuance is a great danger to hu-
man health. It is so clear that it can 
be said In this Senate that we will not 
find one reputable scientific voice which 
will advocate the continuance of bomb 
tests on the grounds that they are a kind 
of fillip for human health or a genetic 
stimulant for the improvement of the 
human species. 
Therefore, the fundamental, If un-
spoken, assumption of the treaty must 
be that neither this Nation nor the So-
viet Union seeks the dubious distinction 
of being the foremost contaminator of 
the earth's physical environment with 
radioactive substances. It is the as-
sumption that the Russians are at least 
rational enough and human enough to 
be concerned with this menace to the 
health of their children and their grand-
children as we are with respect to ours. 
Those may be erroneous assumptions. 
It may be, I suppose, that the Russians 
are so obsessed with being first that it 
Is all the same to them whether the race 
has to do with the Olympic games, the 
moon, economic growth, the ballet, or 
radioactive contamination. It may be 
that this obsession Is so strong that they 
are prepared to sacrifice even their 
progeny to it. 
Even if it were so, even it the Russians 
were Indifferent to the pollution of their 
own place, along with every other na-
tion's place, in the earth's environment, 
then all it would signify is that this 
treaty has little meaning. It would 
signify that the treaty will not do much 
good. But, then, with the safeguards 
which are provided and assured, neither 
will it do much harm. 
For what would happen, Mr. President, 
it we ventured on the assumption that 
the Russians did not wish to menace the 
health of their own people any more 
than we and events proved us wrong? 
At some point in the future, then, the 
Russians would resume atmospheric and 
marine testing. But would they not be 
able to do that In any event In the ab-
.sence of a treaty? What is to stop them? 
And if they resume this dubious process 
of denaturizing the physical environ-
ment of mankind what is to stop us from 
joining in this macabre competition once 
again? Not this treaty, Mr. President. 
There is nothing in this treaty which 
would stop us in those circumstances. 
And it has been made very clear In the 
hearings that we intend to rejoin this 
competition on very short notice If it Is 
forced upon us. 
No, Mr. President, if there is any safe 
assumption in this treaty, it Is that there 
is an absolute mutual interest-that of 
the preservation of human health-
which applies to every nation on this 
globe. This common interest will either 
be pursued in good faith by all nations--
especially by the United States and the 
Soviet Union-or all will suffer the con-
sequences of the failure to do so. There 
is no escape. There Is no way, neither 
sneak nor open, to gain an advantage In 
this matter of health-not for us, not for 
the Soviet Union, not for any nation. 
For the simple fact Is that if there are 
no atmospheric tests, the ~elger counters 
will taper their rhythms everywhere. If 
there are tests, the counters will click 
their warning to human health in every 
part of the world. 
To be sure, Mr. President, there are 
other nations-France and China in par-
ticular-which, health factors notwith-
standing, have already announced that 
they will not adhere to this treaty. Such 
states will remain legally free to test nu-
clear weapons in any other environment. 
But without this treaty such would still 
6e the case. Even at worst, these coun-
tries cannot conceivably pose, for many 
years, anything remotely resembling the 
kind' of threat to human health which is 
implicit in a resumption of unrestricted 
nuclear testing by the United States and 
the Soviet Union. With the treaty effec-
tively maintained between the United 
States, the Soviet Union and the United 
Kingdom, we will have at least a period 
of respite which, in itself, will be of some 
worldwide health benefit. And with the 
adherence of the great bulk of the civil-
ized nations of the world-<>ver 80 na-
tions have already signed the agree-
ment-there will be an opportunity for a 
vigorous and concerted search !or addi-
tional ways to make the treaty univer-
sal in its application. 
Mr. President, let me emphasize that 
there are no grounds for sanguine expec-
tations that this treaty, even if It is rati-
fied by this Nation will bring an end to 
the more dangerous types of nuclear 
testing. It Is a tangible hope; that Is 
all. But against that tangible hope there 
Is certain dlspalr. In the absence of this 
treaty, the process of radioactive con-
tamination of the environment by bomb 
tests will continue and in all probability 
Intensify. Past experience Indicates that 
deploring these tests in speeches and 
party platforms will not end them. In-
troducing Senate resolutions against 
them wm not prevent them. Passing 
resolutions In the U.N. General Assembly 
will not inhibit them. Voluntary mora-
toriums will not stop them. All these 
experiences, short of a treaty, have been 
tried and they have not succeeded. The 
inescapable fact remains that a total 
anarchy in this critical matter still exists 
In the world. The inescapable !act is 
that not only this Nation by every nation 
is still completely free at this moment to 
wreak damage not only on Its own heri-
tage of the earth's environment but on 
that of every other people. And the In-
escapable fact is that the fear of losing 
a technological military advantage or the 
hope of gaining one-this terri!ying fear 
and this elusive hope-which in the past, 
have impelled the Russians no less than 
ourselves to overlook the hazards to 
human health In these tests will almost 
certainly compel us to do the same in 
the future. We shall be so impelled, and 
they shall be so impelled, unless this 
treaty enters into force and is scrupu-
lously maintained on both sides. The 
likelihood-! venture to say, the cer-
tainty-is that without this trooty, the 
danger to the health of all Americans, of 
all human beings, from bomb-made 
radioactivity, w111 multiply. Neither an 
embarrassed silence nor a soft-pedaled 
evasion of experience and fact changes 
the reality one Iota. 
Even if the treaty comes into force, It 
is obvious that this treaty, in itself, will 
fiot halt the continuing and intense 
scientific and technological competition 
to gain a military advantage or to avoid 
losing one. That w111 go on for the pres-
ent on both sides, as is very apparent 
from the Senate hearings and from 
statements emanating from Moscow. 
But what the treaty does do is to put 
a muzzle on one aspect of that competi-
tion. What the treaty does do is to force 
the competition, Insofar as It is now de-
pendent on nuclear testing on both sides, 
out of the atmosphere and from the seas 
and onto the design boards and Into the 
factories and beneath the ground. 
The treaty may not work, Mr. Presi-
dent. It may be cheated or frightened 
or suspicioned or reserved or exceptioned 
into discard, quickly or In time. It may 
be, in the end, no more effective than the 
voluntary moratoriums and the resolu-
tions or whatever of the past. And the 
world w111 go on deploring these tests 
even as they multiply, 
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I hope no Senator wlll vote for ratifi-
cation of this treaty on the mistaken be-
lief that It Is a guarantee that bomb 
tests wm now cease for all times. The 
truth is that in voting for ratification 
of this treaty, as I have already stated, 
we will be voting for a hope. But let me 
stress Mr. President, that it Is a signifi-
cant, a tangible hope. 
And so long as that hope, that tangible 
hope is present, the Senator from Mon-
tana Is not going to tell the people of h is 
State, that he voted to dash it, to kill 
it. He Is not going to tell the people 
whom he represents that President 
Kennedy brought this hope, first raised 
under President Eisenhower, to binding 
treaty form-this hope that there will 
no longer be avoidable increases in the 
incidence of leukemia, bone cancer, 
thyroid cancer, birth malformations, and 
other radiologically Induced deficiencies 
among Montanans and Americans and 
all human beings-but, for a variety of 
reasons, he could not support the Presi-
dent. The Senator from Montana is not 
going to say that he could not support 
the President because the French Gov-
ernment or the Chinese Communist gov-
ernment did not like the treaty. Nor will 
he say It because a prominent scientist 
out of a large number of prominent sci-
entists registered the very unscientific 
fiat of his own opinion that the treaty 
was a dreadful tragic mistake. Nor will 
he say It because he is convinced that in 
a wasteful spending competition on ar-
maments, our taxpayers can outspend 
the Russians, spend them into bank-
ruptcy without going bankrupt ourselves. 
Nor will he say it because the statis-
tical evidence showed only a few Amer-
icans would die before their time or only 
a few American children would be born 
malformed because of tests already con-
ducted. Nor will he say it because the 
treaty might also be signed by East Ger-
many and he would much rather that 
the East Germans begin testing nuclear 
bombs than that even the remotest sug-
gestion be given that the United States 
had, by getting Into the same treaty, 
somehow recognized the existence of this 
East German regime. 
Nor w11! he say it because he believes 
that Russians, who most certainly cannot 
be trusted In many things, cannot be 
trusted even to cease denaturlzing their 
own environment along with ours and 
everyone else's on earth. 
No, Mr. President, the Senator from 
Montana Is not going to tell Montanans 
that he opposed this treaty on any of 
these grounds. Yet all have been ad-
vanced at one time or another in the past 
weeks as grounds for rejecting this treaty 
There is one ground--<me ground 
alone-on which the Senator !rom Mon-
tana would be prepared to go home and 
tell the people who sent him to Wash-
Ington that these tests In the atmosphere 
and In the seas must go on despite the 
great potential threat of their continu-
ance to their health and to their chil-
dren's health. 
He would not make light of these 
health risks or pass over them but he 
would ask his constituents to accept 
them In all their grim portent because he 
was persuaded that this treaty would ex-
pose the Nation, to a greater extent than 
we now are, to a military attack which 
would destroy both the meaning and 
much of the substance of the life which 
we have built. 
He would not ask them to accept the 
health risks of Indiscriminate and un-
controlled nuclear testing If all he had 
was a personal surmise that the risks of 
military attack would Increase, if all he 
had were vague personal doubts and hesi-
tancies in the face of a new course. To 
ask them to accept the health risks, he 
would have to find m the total record 
specifics for concluding that the nsks of 
military attack would be significantly in-
creased by our adherence to this treaty. 
He would have to find , in specifics, af-
firmative answers to these questions : 
First. Is there some nation, other than 
the Soviet Union-Communist China, 
for example-which, by not adhering to 
this treaty, Is likely to develop a nuclear 
technology which will approximate ours 
In the next decade, another nation which 
could close the nuclear gap solely be-
cause it tested and we did not? The 
answer is "No." 
Second. If the Soviet Union, then, is 
the one nation which poses a nuclear 
threat to the United States in the next 
decade or more, has that nation already 
achieved a substantial advantage, on 
balance, over the United States in the 
military technology derived !rom nu-
clear physics-the kind of advantage 
which we might neutralize by a continu-
ance of aboveground tests on our side 
even though they also continued to im-
prove their techniques through such 
testing on their side? The answer, Inso-
far as It is possible to answer the ques-
tion, on the basis of fact, knowledge and 
the overwhelming judgment of the most 
highly skilled and qualified witnesses ln 
the Nation is "No." 
Third. Is there any reason to assume 
that our adavnces in nuclear science and 
its application to military technology 
w!ll be hampered to a greater degree 
than that of the Soviet Union, In the 
complete absence of atmospheric and 
marine tests on both sides? The answer 
Is "No." 
Fourth. By the terms of this treaty, 
wlll the Soviet Union be legally author-
ized to do anything which we are not also 
authorized to do? The answer is "No." 
Fifth. By the terms of this treaty aFe 
we legally forbidden to do anything 
which the Soviet Union is not legally for-
bidden to do? The answer Is "No." 
Sixth. Is there any other than the 
most remote possibility that the Soviet 
Union could engage in prohibited but 
significant tests without detection? The 
answer Is "No." 
Seventh. If the Soviet Union were 
to engage In a clandestine test and 11 it 
were identified or if we had very valid 
reason to believe that such a test had 
occurred even if not identtfted, would 
we ourselves still be bound to forego a 
resumption in testing above ground? 
The answer Is "No." 
Eighth. Is there a significant possibil-
ity that a single Soviet test suddenly 
sprung upon us could so alter the bal-
ance of military forces between the two 
nations as to increase the risk of mill-
tary attack upon us. The answer 1s 
''No." 
In short, the answer to every spectftc 
doubt which Involves the possibility of 
the Soviet Union or any nation gaining 
some unique or significant military ad-
vantage as against ourselves in this 
treaty is not "Yes" but "No." And be-
cause It Is no, I cannot in good con-
science ask any citizen of Montana to 
accept the heightened risks to the health 
of their families which will be inevitable 
in the absence of the ratification of this 
treaty by the United States. 
If there are not specific grounds of 
unique disadvantage to the military de-
fense of the Nation for rejecting this 
treaty, what other grounds can there 
be? One detects in the few articulate 
opponents of this treaty a consistent 
theme which suggests a basis for the re-
maining doubts and hesitancies. It is, 
apparently, the belief that our scientific-
military complex Is so superior to all 
others that if not subjected to any lim-
itation as to nuclear testing, it will pro-
duce an amazing advance in military-
nuclear technology. The complex, It Is 
suggested, will achieve some incredible 
breakthrough so as to widen, once and 
for all, the gap as between ourselves and 
the Soviet Union. That the Soviet 
Union, of course, in the absence of a 
testing limitation, will also be free to 
seek a similar breakthrough is either 
overlooked or regarded of little conse-
quence. That there are dangers to 
health in the continuing process of un-
controlled testing by both sides, of 
course, is either overlooked or regarded 
as of little consequence. 
Mr. President, I have the highest re-
spect for our nuclear physics. our indus-
trial technology, our military leadership, 
and our capacity to merge them into a 
powerful complex for the purpose of the 
Nation's defense. This complex is second 
to none In the world. But admiration 
and respect for these capacities do not 
and must never compel the elected om-
Cials of this Nation to accept the dictum 
of this complex as to what is best for the 
people of the United States. 
The fact is that this treaty will Intro-
duce no curbs upon the creativity and 
dynamism of the complex which are not 
also placed equally upon such complexes 
in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the 
world. That men of scientific genius or 
highly developed technological speciali-
zation may find such curbs irksome or 
burdensome is understandable. But 
there Is too much at stake here, for the 
Nation and tor the world, for the Senate 
to be persuaded by individual considera-
tions of that kind. 
Indeed, reason and experience must 
lead us to question most seriously the 
course of policy which fiows from such 
considerations. It is the course which 
assumes that If we will only continue to 
debar any restraints on testing, It we will 
only continue to throw considerations of 
public health to the winds, our scientists 
and our technicians will create that de-
cisive nuclear gap, that ultimate military 
gap, which will insure the Nation's secu-
rity. 
Have we not in reality followed pre-
cisely such a course since the first atomic 
Mike Mansfield Papers: Series 21, Box 42 , Folder 2 Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 15167 
bombs in the New Mexico Flats and over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What re-
straints, indeed, what reins have been 
placed on the full exploration of this 
immense power of nuclear destruction in 
all these years? Not those of money, to 
be sure. Not those of a ban on testing, 
to be sure. Through all these years since 
World War II there has been no treaty to 
bar nuclear tests of any kind. We have 
tested again and again. The Russians 
have done the same. 
What has happened, Mr. President? 
We began in 1945 with the atomic bomb, 
with what we believed was the decisive 
gap, the ultimate gap. By 1949, 4 years 
later, the Russians began to close that 
gap with their first atomic test. In 1952, 
we opened what we believed was the de-
cisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the 
first explosion of the immensely more 
powerful hydrogen bomb. And by 1953, 
9 months later, that gap too began to 
close in a Soviet test of a similar type of 
weapon. 
So we must ask ourselves, Mr. Presi-
dent: What has happened in all these 
years of unrestricted testing? Has the 
gap widened with the free rein which has 
been allowed to the scientific-industrial-
military complex? Have we· gained the 
absolute advantage, the ultimate advan-
tage which will guarantee the Nation's 
security? The truth is that the gap has 
not widened. On the contrary, it has 
narrowed almost to the vanishing point. 
It has narrowed both in terms of the 
basic knowledge of the sciences involved 
and in terms of the application of that 
knowledge in military technology. 
Once no nation, except ourselves, 
could have inflicted on any other, tens 
ot millions of nuclear deaths in a matter 
of hours. Now, we ourselves, no less 
than others, are subject to a catastrophe 
of this magnitude. 
In short, the Nation has not been made 
more secure in any real sense by this 
indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit of 
security by nuclear development through 
almost two decades, for the simple rea-
son that others were also engaged in the 
same indiscriminate and unchecked pur-
suit. This Jurious and frantic race for 
superiority in the capacity to inflict nu-
clear devastation in mass or in caliperic 
refinement in the interests of national 
security in the end has provided security 
to no nation. It has provided only the 
assurance that the prospect of immedi-
ate and massive destruction to others 
will be at least as great as that prospect 
is to ourselves. That is vitally important 
Insurance in the kind of world in which 
we llve, but let us not delude ourselves 
as to the nature of the coverage. We 
have provided, not security for the Na-
tion, but only insurance that if our civili-
zation is put to the nuclear torch by any 
hand, others will be consumed in the 
same stupendous blaze. 
To cling to the belief that the continu-
ance of indiscriminate testing is the 
margin which provides for the security 
at this Nation is to fly in the face of the 
reallty of experience. It is not a scien-
tific view. It is not even an understand-
able pride and faith in our own great 
scientlftc, technological, and mllitary 
No. l38--6 
capacities. It is a mystic and egocentric 
be!Jef which borders-and I choose the 
words carefully-on a most dangerous 
and tragic obsession. 
Mr. President, this treaty, in itself, is 
no answer to that obsession. This treaty 
is but a slender strand of hope drawn 
painfully from the web of conflicting 
interests, hideous fears and fatuous and 
immature arrogances 'Out of which are 
spun the relations of nations in our 
times. It is an evidence, slight and un-
certain, but an evidence, that there ex-
ists that capacity of courage and that 
will to life which may yet bring to bear 
on this stiftling entanglement the quiet 
and simple power of human reason. 
Do not, Mr. President, look for mir-
acles from this treaty. There are none. 
This Nation, the Soviet Union, and the 
world are destined to live for a long time 
with feet dangling over the grave that 
beckons to the human civilization which 
is our common heritage. Against that 
immense void of darkness, this treaty is 
a feeble candle. It is a flicker of light 
where there has been no light. 
The Senator from Montana will vote 
for this light, and he will hope for its 
strengthening by subsequent acts of rea-
son on all sides. He will vote for ap-
proval of this treaty because it is, on 
clear balance, in the Interests of the 
people of his State and the United States. 
He will vote for it because it is a testa-
ment to the universal vitality of reason. 
He will vote for it because it is an af-
firmation of human life itself. 
Mr. President, that the record may be 
complete, I ask unanimous consent that 
two previous statements which I have 
made in connection with the treaty be 
included at this point in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
[From the CONGRESSWNAL RECORD, July 29 , 
19631 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a.t the pres-
ent time the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, the Committee on Armed Services, a.nd 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a.re 
meeting, In Informal session, to hear a. brief-
Ing on the proposed pa.rtlal test ba.n treaty 
by the Under Secretary of State, the Honor-
able Averell Harriman, who !s accompanied 
by Mr. Wllllam Foster. At the meeting the 
questions are both searching a.nd blunt, 
judging from what I ca.n gather; a.nd I a.m 
sure everyone would agree that the proposed 
agreement was openly arrived at and could 
be considered a.n open agreement. 
In response to questions, the distinguished 
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Harriman, 
stated that there were no gimmicks or side 
Issues attached to the proposal, which shortly 
w!ll be before the Senate. 
In connection w!th the proposed partial 
nuclear-test-ban agreement, I e.sk unani-
mous consent that there be printed In the 
RECORD a statement Issued by me over the 
weekend, relative to this most Important 
matter. 
There being no objection, the statement 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, e.s 
follows: 
"STATEMENT BY SENATOR MANSFIELD 
"The proposed partial test ba.n a.greemen t 
represents a. breakthrough In the cold wa.r 
a.nd could, 1! properly observed by both 
sides, be ihe first break In the clouds In 
many years. 
"It Is a. tribute to the pers is tence, blp~rt l­
sanshlp and wisdom , first, of President Elsen-
hower In 1959 a nd, then, or President Ken-
nedy a.nd or the many Members o r the 
Senate and Congress as, for exnmplP, the 
dlstlngulshcd Senator from Tenner;see l l\1r. 
GOREI , the majority whip IMr. HuMPHREY I, 
and the Senator !rom Connec ticut 1 Mr. Dono] 
whose reeolutio n in fnvor o f an ngrcezncnt 
along the lines which have been reac hed Is 
cosponsored by 33 o t her Senators, members 
of both parties. 
"These men recognized the need for an end 
to above-gro und tests-on publlc health 
grounds. If no other-nnd refused to be d is -
couraged In s pite of many setbacks and dls-
appoin tmen ts. They thought In far-sigh ted 
terms a.nd In huma n terms- or this gener-
ation and of chlldren yet to be bo rn- Amer-
Ican chlldrcn, Russia n chlldren, Indeed, nll 
the wodd's chlldren. 
"The agreement wo uld n o t mean a. cut-
back In defense appropriatio ns but a. stabl-
llzatlon rather than an Increase or those 
expend! tures. 
"In a sense It Is a gamble, but In view of 
the critical nature of the problem and the 
fac t that we can continue underground tes t-
Ing, It Is In my opinion worth the effort. The 
escape clause protects us ln a.n honorable 
manner a.nd safeguards rather than weakens 
our defense. The !act that our chle! nego-
tiator we.s Averell Harriman who has never 
been taken In by the Soviet Union, ever since 
he first served a.s Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union two decades ago, Is an earnest that 
our rights have been fully protected. The 
agreement, In my opinion, serves the Interests 
of our country. our people, and our securltv. 
"If this agreement Is approved It does not 
mean that there w!ll be total or unllateral 
disarmament either soon or In the future . 
What this new agreement wlll give us Is 
more clean milk and water and food for our 
chlldren, less strontium to pollute the alr, 
a.nd some ba.sls !or hoping that future gen-
erations wlll grow up a.s normal, healthy 
human beings. 
"This agreement wlll, In my opinion, serve 
the people's Interest, give us some time to 
face up to other differences, and allow more 
'breathing' space to the end that a better 
kind of peace !or mankind can be achieved. 
"It would be wrong to make too much of 
this agreement. But, even more, It would 
be wrong to make too llttle or lt. A step, 
however small, In the direction or preserv-
Ing a. world fit !or human habitation Is an 
immense stride In the history of human 
clvll!zatlon." 
[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 31 , 
196JI 
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there have 
been Inferences In the press to the effect 
that polltlca.l partisanship ma.y be motivat-
Ing the distinguished minority leader 1 Mr. 
DIRKSEN] and the chairman of the Repub-
llca.n pollcy committee, the ranking minor-
Ity member o! the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee a.nd the Joint Atomic Energy Com-
mittee (Mr. HrcJtENLOOPER] In their attitudes 
toward the nuclear teEt treaty. 
It Is most disturbing to me, Mr. President, 
to witness this eH'ort to !an the tla.rnes of 
partisanship on a. matter o! such urgent nnd 
ovenldlng national Importance. I must re-
ject any such Inference Insofar as It Involves 
the minority leader [Mr. 'DrRKS!:N] or the 
distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICK-
ENLOoPER] or, !or that matter, any other 
Senator-Republlcan or Democrat. 
Both a.re men o! the highest patriotism, 
a.nd have shown time a.nd again a mature 
and unquallfied capacity to place the na-
tional Interest In foreign relations above 
partisan consideration. They have con-
sistently supported the main body or Amer!-
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can policy through several administrations-
administrations of both parties. 
Their attitude Is entirely In order. It Is 
their responsibility as Senators-I\Ot as Re-
publicans-In positions of great responsibil-
Ity to be most prudent and careful In the 
consideration of this proposed treaty. And 
may I say that the same applies to the 
majority leader and the rest of the leader-
ship on this side of the. aisle. 
It would have been, Indeed, Inappropriate 
at this time for the Senator from Illinois, 
no less than the Senator from Montana, to 
have gone to Moscow tor the ceremony of 
signing the treaty. 
There Is a great backlog of legislation In 
process In the Senate at this time, highly 
Important legislation to the Nation In many 
fields; and both the minority leader and the 
majority leader must continue to try, as we 
have been trying, to bring this legislation 
to the point of decision In the Senate. 
As It Is, an exceptionally appropriate bi-
partisan group will go to Moscow from the 
Senate-not necessarily to approve, but to 
represent the Senate for the signing That Is 
as It should be, for an occasion which In-
volves the constitutional responsibility o! 
the Senate to advise and consent with re-
spect to treaty ratification. The Senators 
who are going- the distinguished chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. 
FuLBRIGHT]; the Senator f:om Minnesota 
[Mr. HUMPHREY], the deputy majority leader, 
whose name has long been associated with 
this effort; the Senator from Rhode Island 
[Mr. PASTORE]. who as chairman of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy haa great 
knowledge of the subject matter of the 
treaty; the distinguished Senator from Ver-
mont [Mr. AIKEN], the senior Republican In 
this body, wise with a long experience In 
the Senate and In foreign relations and 
atomic energy; and the Senator from Massa-
chusetts (Mr. SALTONSTALL] ranking Repub-
lican of the Armed Services and Appropria-
tions Committees--this group or Senators 
who are going, Mr. President, Is admirably 
equipped to represent the Senate with dig-
nity and wisdom on this highly significant 
occasion or worldwide significance. 
This bipartisan group, Mr. President, of 
which I personally am extremely proud, Is 
In keeping with the spirit or bipartisanship 
which has guided the policy of the United 
States from the outset on the matter of nu-
clear testing. In a matter which Involves 
the safety or the Nation and the health of 
our people, and particularly our children, 
there Is no room for partisanship. Certainly 
a treaty which would seek to prevent pre-
cisely those nuclear explosions which are 
most contaminative or our physical environ-
ment can be regarded as such a matter. Cer-
tainly, too, this proposed treaty has Impli-
cations !or the safety or the Nation. 
I do n o t prejudge, Mr. President, the Sen-
ate 's action with regard to the treaty. But 
the records of the distinguished minority 
lender [Mr. DIRKSEN], and of the Senator 
from Iowa (Mr. HICKENLOOPER] In matters Of 
this kind , as I have noted, of'Cer great as-
surance that the question of the treaty will 
be examined In terms of the highest national 
Interest and free of partisanship. 
Moreover, Mr. President, both parties In 
the campaign of 1960 adopted positions 
clearly In line with what has now been 
achieved In the Initialed treaty to end nuclear 
tes ting. I must say, in all honesty, that the 
Republican p;atform is clearer on this point 
tha n the Democratic platform. But I am 
sure that t his is primarily a matter of drafts-
m.lnship. and is not indicative In any way 
or a lesser desire on the part of Democrats 
to bring £1bout an end to these dangerous 
tes ts. Democrats as a Whole are just as con-
cerned as Republicans when the safety and 
health or the Nation are at stake. In any 
even t. Mr. President, I read Into the RECORD 
at th is point the reference to nuclear testing 
In the Republican and Democratic platforms 
of 196Q. 
The Democratic platform, 1000, section II, 
under the heading "Arma Control," states: 
"A primary task Is to develop responsible 
proposals that wiiJ help break the deadlock 
on arms control. 
"Such proposals should Include means !or 
ending nuclear tests unc!er workable safe-
guards, cutting back nuc· "ar weapons, reduc-
ing conventional forces, preserving outer 
space for peaceful purposes, preventing sur-
prise attack and llml ting the risk of acci-
dental war." 
Thl! Republlcan platform, 1000, under the 
heading "Foreign Polley," states 
"We are slmllarly ready to negctiate and 
to Institute reallstic methods and safeguards 
for disarmament and !or the suspension of 
nuclear tests. We advocate an early agree-
ment by all nations to forego nuclear tests 
In the atmosphere, and the suspension of 
other tests as verification techniques per-
mit. We support the President to any deci-
sion he may make to reevaluate the ques-
tion of resumption or underground nuclear 
explosions testing, if the Geneva Confer-
ence falls to produce a satisfactory agree-
ment. We have deep concern about the 
mounting nuclear arms race. This concern 
leads us to seek disarmament and nuclear 
agreements. And an equal concern to pro-
tect all people from nuclear danger leads us 
to insist that such agreements have ade-
quate safeguards." 
Again I say that I am extremely proud of 
the bipartisan group which has been selected 
to represent this body and this country at 
Moscow. I do not belleve that under any cir-
cumstances a more capable group, or men of 
greater Integrity and patriotism, could have 
been selected. 
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I appreciate 
the generous statement by the distinguished 
majority leader [Mr. MANSMELD]. I need no 
defense for my conduct. I have always been 
willing to assume full respooslbllity for what 
I say and do. Under the Constitution the 
Senate has the duty and responslblllty to 
advise and consent to a treaty. That action 
must constitute an Independent judgment, 
and that judgment I will render under my 
oath, according to my conscience, and with-
In the limit or my perception as I can bring 
It to bear. 
I recall that once a President sought as-
sistance in building up support for a League 
of Nations. Members of my party followed 
him throughout the country. He returned 
from that tour a broken and dejected mao. 
It always hurt me to think that happened 
to a great scholar who was then the Presi-
dent or the United States-Woodrow Wllsoo. 
For myself I try never to embarrass the 
President of the United States. I shall al-
ways bend over backward to make certain 
that he is not projected into any awkward 
situation. 
Ten days ago I went to the Press Gallery 
of this body. The question was asked 
whether I had been invited to go to Moscow. 
The answer was that I had not been invited, 
directly or Indirectly, remotely or otherwise, 
by anyone, anywhere, at any time. 
Second, I stated that If I were Invited. I 
would not go. I made that statement pub-
llcly on a number of occasions. In so doin« 
I closed the door tor myself and for anyo;~ 
else who might undertake to iad te me. I 
wlll never embarrass an;oue. I made that 
abundantly clear. Not the least, of course . 
Of the COnsideratiOnS that C'O t e:-Pr1 l n~) f ) li' t 
decision is the fact that V.P urt t>r- .ct with 
so much work. I did not f•·e l Llla t r_rruld 
take time off and go to Moscow for that pur-
pose, since the occasion was a ceremony of 
slgoioe;, and no negotiation was Involved . 
I am deeply grateful to my distinguished 
friend from Montana for the generous state-
ment that he made on the fioor of the Sen-
ate. Beyond that, I know o! nothing I need 
say. I have neither encouraged nor d.le-
couraged any Member of this body from t&k-
lng that trip 1! he were Invited to go. Eveq. 
Senator has equal prerogatives. I do not feel 
that It Is either my responslblllty or my 
prerogative to undertake to tell other Mem-
bers of this distinguished body what they 
should do under those circumstances. So I 
leave the case there. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, last night the 
President of the United States asked me to 
go to Moscow as a representative or the 
United States In the final ceremony prelimi-
nary to the signing of the test ban treaty. 
Of the 100 Members of the Senate, I do not 
belleve there Is anyone who dlsllkea the 
thought of a foreign trip any more than I do. 
But when the President of the United States 
asked me to take the trip in the Interest of 
the United States, I did not think I had any 
right to fold my hands and tell him that I 
did not want to go, and that I am not going. 
Mr. President, when any program Is Initi-
ated that looks toward the easing of tension 
throughout the world, and has for Its pur-
pose the averting of a war throughout the 
world, even though such program offers only 
a faint hope-and in my opinion that Is 
what the proposed test ban treaty does-I do 
not think I have any right to say that I am 
not interested In any effort for peace In the 
world regardless of whether It promises Im-
mediate and early success or not. 
Mr. President, as one Member of this body 
who was aaked to go to Moscow I can say that 
I have not· been asked to commit myself In 
any way. I understand that no Member of 
the Senate will be asked to sign the treaty. 
I agree that Congress should examine every 
line of the document when It Is submitted to 
us for our approval or disapproval. It Is 
proper that we should weigh the benet!ta of 
approval against .any possible disadvantages 
or risks which we may run. It 1s probable 
that we may have to weigh our hopes against 
our fears. I have heard It said that Congress 
ought not to be represented at this meeting 
because Congress did not participate In writ-
Ing the treaty. May I say that many Mem-
bers o! the Congress were shown the treaty 
10 days ago-a week ago last Monday. I 
have examined It closely. I have read and 
reread It from end to end and from the 
middle toward both ends. I know that 
probably hal! the Members of the Senate 
have had the same opportunity that I have 
had. 
I do not believe It is a proper function of 
the legislative br!lllch of Government to 
wrl te treaties. It Is our function to approve 
or to disapprove them after they have been 
prepared by the executive branch of the 
Government. 
In this case I must say that the executive 
branch of the Government did seek the ap-
proval of three committees of the Congress 
before finally authorizing the Initialing ot 
the treaty a week ago. 
My position now Is that, unless I am shown 
more evidence than has appeared to date 
that the treaty will be disadvantageous to 
the United States, I expect to support Its 
approval when It comes before the Senate 
for 11 vute. I reserve the right to vote as I 
bellc1·c p roper when the time comes and after 
full llcru·llie"S have J::>een hPlrl 
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